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Penal Code § 454 (amended).
SB 2067 (Roberti); 1992 STAT. Ch. 581
(Effective August 31, 1992)
Prior law provided that every person who committed arson1 that
caused great bodily injury or that caused an inhabited structure to
burn, during and within an area of a state of insurrection2 or a state
of emergency,3 was punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for three, five, or seven years.4 Chapter 581 changes the punishment
for these types of arson, when committed within these specified
areas, to five, seven or nine years.5
In addition, Chapter 581 provides that every person who
unlawfully possesses, manufactures, or disposes of a firebomb
6
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 451 (West Supp. 1992) (defining arson); cf FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 806.01, 806.031, 806.111 (West 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 20-1, 20-2 (Smith-Hurd
1977 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 150-150.20 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992) (providing
similar definitions of arson).
2. See CAL. MIL. & VEr. CODE § 143 (West 1988) (defining state of insurrection).
3. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8558(b) (West 1992) (defining state of emergency).
4. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 145, sec. 13, at 340 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 454). See
generally Rioting in Los Angeles Destroyed Arson Leads, N.Y. TIMfs, June 11, 1992, at A14; King
Case Aftermath: A City in Crisis, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at A9 (describing the extent of the
damage caused by arson, and the difficulties of investigating and prosecuting the crime).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 454(b) (amended by Chapter 581). Chapter 581 also provides that
any person who violates § 452 or subdivision (b) of § 453 will be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for three, five, or seven years. Id. Arson, as defied in § 451 of the Penal Code is
willfully and maliciously setting fire to, or burning or causing to be burned, or aiding, counseling,
or procuring the burning of any structure, forest land or property. L § 451 (West Supp. 1992).
Section 452 of the Penal Code addresses the crime of unlawfully causing a fire and defines the crime
as recklessly setting fire to, or burning, or causing to be burned, any structure, forest land or property.
Id § 452 (West 1988). Section 453(b) of the Penal Code provides that every person who possesses,
manufactures, or disposes of a firebomb is guilty of a felony. Id § 453(b) (West 1988). Chapter 581
also states that probation may not be granted to any person convicted of violating this section, except
in unusual cases where the interest of justice would best be served. Il § 454(c) (amended by Chapter
581); see id. § 1203(a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining probation).
6. See id. § 453(b) (West 1988) (defining firebomb as a breakable container containing a
flammable liquid with a flashpoint of 150 degrees Fahrenheit or less, having a wick or similar device
capable of being ignited, but specifying that no device commercially manufactured primarily for the
purpose of illumination will be deemed to be a firebomb for the purposes of this subdivision). See
People v. Diamond, 2 Cal. App. 3d. 860, 863, 83 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (1969) (holding that § 452(a) of
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during and within these specified areas shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for three, five, or seven years.'
CPH
Crimes; child abuse--sentencing enhancement
Penal Code § 273d (amended).
SB 14 (Lockyer); 1992 STAT. Ch. 917
Under existing law, anyone who willfully' inflicts cruel or
inhuman corporal punishment or injury upon a child2, which results
in a traumatic condition,3 is guilty of a felony that is punishable by
imprisonment in a state prison for two (2), four (4), or six (6) years
or in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of up to
$6,000 or by both.4
the Penal Code (now § 453) is not unconstitutionally vague, and that mere possession of a flammable
explosive or combustible material, substance or device is not a crime; to constitute a crime, such
possession must be accompanied by a specific intent to wilfully and maliciously bum buildings or
property).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 454(b) (amended by Chapter 581); see 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 581, sec.
3, at _ (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 454) (stating that this is an urgency statute necessary for
the protection of the public from situations similar to those which occurred during the Los Angeles
and San Francisco riots of April 29 through May 3, 1992).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 1988) (defining willfully); see also People v. Atkins,
53 Cal. App. 3d 348, 358, 125 Cal. Rptr. 855, 861 (1975) (holding that a general intent to inflict any
cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury on a child will suffice for "willfully"),
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165 (West Supp. 1992) (defining child); see also People v.
Thomas, 65 Cal. App. 3d 854, 858, 135 Cal. Rptr. 644, 646 (1976) (holding that "child" means
"minor" and is a chronological, not a physical, determination).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(c) (West Supp. 1992) (defining traumatic condition); see
Thomas, 65 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 646 (describing "traumatic condition" as a wound
or any type of detrimental condition of the body caused by the use of force by another).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273d(a) (amended by Chapter 917); see People v. Lofink, 206 Cal.
App. 3d 161, 163-64, 253 Cal. Rptr. 384, 385-86 (1988) (stating that three-month old child's father
was properly convicted of felony child abuse under § 273d after it was shown that the child's broken
wrist, ankle and rib occurred while he was in the care of his father, and that the injuries were non-
accidental); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03 (West Supp. 1992) (defining and criminalizing aggravated
child abuse); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93 (west 1986) (defining and criminalizing cruelty to
juveniles); Kama v. State, 507 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that father was
guilty of aggravated child abuse under § 827.03(3) after hitting his ten (10) year old stepson across
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Prior to Chapter 917, if such injury resulted in the child's death
and the prosecutor could not prove murder5 or voluntary
manslaughter,6 the most severe charge available to the prosecutor
was that of involuntary manslaughter 7 which carries a lighter
sentence than if the injury to the child did not result in the child's
death.8
Under Chapter 917, willful infliction of injury upon a child,
which is the direct cause of the child's death, but is done without
the back with a belt and in the face with his fist); State v. Sumler, 395 So.2d 766, 767, 769-70 (La.
Sup. Ct. 1981) (affirming conviction of a mother under § 14:93 for cruelty to juveniles when she
prevented her 18-month old son from leaving a tub full of scalding hot water which resulted in his
sustaining third degree bums over 30% of his body).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187(a), 189, 190 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (defiming first and
second degree murder and their respective penalties of death or 25 years to life and 15 years to life
in a state prison); see id. § 188 (West 1988) (defining malice); see also People v. Smith, 35 Cal. 3d
798, 803-04, 678 P.2d 886, 889, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311,314 (1984) (holding that felony child abuse that
results in the child's death is "an integral part of the homicide," and is therefore precluded from
supporting a conviction based upon the felony-murder rule); People v. Caffero, 207 Cal. App. 3d 678,
682-84, 255 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (1989) (holding that felony child abuse is not "inherently dangerous
to human life," and therefore may not support a conviction based upon the felony-murder rule). See
generally Barry Bendetowies, Felony Murder and Child Abuse: A Proposal For The New York
Legislature, 18 FORDHAMt URB. L.J 383, 383-84 (1990) (advocating the passage of a child abuse
statute that would suffice as the predicate felony supporting a felony-murder charge).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 192(a), 193(a) (West 1988) (defining voluntary manslaughter).
The penalty for voluntary manslaughter is three (3), six (6), or eleven (11) years in a state prison.
Id. § 193(a) (West 1988).
7. See id. § 192(b), 193(b) (West 1988) (criminalizing involuntary manslaughter and
providing a penalty of two (2), three (3), or four (4) years in a state prison).
8. Id. § 190(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1992); id. § 193(a)-(c) (West 1988) (describing the
punishments for murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter). See generally Jim
Trotter, Child Got Death; Killer Got 7 Years, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 14, 1990, at A2 (describing
the death of Danielle Edson-Savory, an 18-month old child who was beaten to death by her babysitter
in Yolo County). According to the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office, of the 64% of the child
abuse deaths filed in that county as second degree murder cases during the fiscal year June 1990-9 1,
23 % resulted in convictions, 72 % resulted in convictions for involuntary manslaughter or felony child
abuse, and the remaining 5% resulted in acquittals. See generally Pat Alston, Murder Most Foul:
Prosecutor says laws too soft on parents who kill, SANTA MONICA OUTLOOK, Sept. 2, 1991, at § A
(discussing the lack of statutory protection for children abused to death).
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malice or intent, shall carry a penalty of imprisonment for three (3),
six (6), or nine (9) years, which is similar to the penalty for voluntary
manslaughter.'
ACR
Crimes; commuted sentences--battered women
Penal Code § 4801 (amended).
AB 3436 (Friedman); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1138
Existing law provides that the Board of Prison Terms (Board)'
may report to the Governor the names of any persons imprisoned in
any state prison that the Board determines should receive a
commuted sentence or be pardoned due to good conduct, unusual
term of sentence, or any other cause which should entitle the prisoner
to a pardon or commuted sentence.2 Chapter 1138 specifies that the
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273d(b) (amended by Chapter 917) (providing that a conviction shall
be punished by imprisonment in state prison for three (3), six (6), or nine (9) years).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3040 (West 1982) (empowering the Board to parole prisoners
outside prison walls or prison camps); id. § 4810 (West 1982) (providing the powers and duties of
the Board); id. § 5003.5 (West 1982) (providing that the Board may advise and recommend specific
policies to the Director of Corrections, and stating that the Board and Director should cooperate to
establish policies regarding classification, transfer, and discipline).
2. Id § 4801(a) (amended by Chapter 1138).
Pacific Law Journal/lVol. 24
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Board may report to the Governor names of prisoners that the Board
determines should receive a commuted sentence or pardon on
account of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS).'
TRF
Crimes; controlled substances
Health and Safety Code § 11383 (amended).
AB 823 (Alpert and Peace); 1992 STAT. Ch. 49
3. Id. (amended by Chapter 1138); see CAL. CODE REas. tit. 15, §§ 2815-2819 (1991)
(specifying the requirements needed to be fulfilled in order for the Governor to commute a sentence);
Edward S. Coleman, Commutation of Sentence, Conditions Attached by Governor, 26 S. CAL. L.
REv. 92, 92 (1952) (discussing the Governor's powers to commute prisoners' sentences); Carolyn
W. Kaas, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Support of a
Claim of Self-Defense, 15 CONN. L. REv. 121, 121 n.1 (1982) (defining BWS); Rebecca Hudsmith,
The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome in Battered Women's Self-
Defense Cases in Louisiana, 47 LA. L. REv. 979, 979-83 (1987) (establishing a workable definition
of BWS); cf MD. CODE ANN. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916(a)(2),(b)(2) (Supp. 1992) (permitting
expert testimony on Battered Spousal Syndrome at trial, and defining Battered Spousal Syndrome as
the same condition recognized in the medical and scientific community as BWS); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson Supp. 1991) (permitting introduction of expert testimony on BWS into
evidence at trial); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-210 (1992) (providing that parole board can release
a prisoner on medical parole if a physician diagnoses the prisoner as having a syndrome that renders
the person incapable of presenting a danger to society); Mo. REv. STAT. § 38-563.033 (West 1992)
(permitting evidence of BWS at trial in determining whether the defendant acted in self-defense). See
generally CHARLES P. EwING, BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1987) (arguing that there should be a new legal justification of homicide
which the author terms "psychological self-defense"); CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE:
BATrERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW (1989) (exploring the historical, legal, and societal
reasons why battered women have generally been unsuccessful in using self-defense as an excuse to
their committing homicide); LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMEN (1979) (detailing the results
of the author's studies on battered women, and coining the term "battered woman syndrome"); Mira
Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the
Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253 (1987) (arguing that expert testimony should not be used in
the trials of battered women); Florida Oks 'battered woman' defense, CHI. TRIP., Dec. 19, 1991, at
21 (stating that Ohio, Texas, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Florida currently allow BWS to be
considered in clemency board hearings, and that 14 other states are considering allowing a similar
review process); Abuse: Valid Defense? Battered woman syndrome makes gains in the courtroom,
ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 21, 1991, at 1 (stating that Washington allows clemency hearings for woman
who suffer from BWS).
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Existing law provides that any person' who possesses 2
ephedrine3 in combination with other specified chemicals4 , with the
intent to manufacture5 methamphetamine6 , is guilty of a felony.7
Under Chapter 49, any person who, with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine or any of its analogs,8 possesses ephedrine alone9
is guilty of a felony.'0
CPH
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11022 (West 1991) (defining person).
2. See People v. Small, 205 Cal. App. 3d 319, 325-26, 252 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45-46 (1988)
(upholding a conviction for possession and manufacture of methamphetamine by evidence of
defendant's presence at a house at three o'clock in the morning in which an illegal lab was operating,
evidence of his fingerprints in the lab, and evidence of his personal possession and use of the drug);
People v. Sullivan, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 1453, 264 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288 (1989) (holding that when
the defendant was not allowed an instruction to the effect that the handling of methamphetamine for
the purpose of destroying or abandoning it would not support a conviction for possession).
3. See STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 521 (25th ed. 1990) (defining ephedrine).
4. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 11383(c) (amended by Chapter 49) (listing tie
chemicals that, if found with ephedrine, constitute a felony where the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine is also found).
5. See Small, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 325-26, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46 (specifying the evidence
necessary to show intent to manufacture methamphetamine); People v. Telfer, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1194,
1204, 284 Cal. Rptr. 913, 919 (1991) (holding that the prosecutor did not have to prove that the
defendant was aware of the physical character of the substance being manufactured in order to
convict the defendant of manufacturing methamphetamine).
6. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIoNARY 521 (25th ed. 1990) (defining methamphetamine).
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11383(c) (amended by Chapter 49); cf 21 U.S.C. §§
801-971 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 893.01-893.165 (West 1976 & Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 56 1/2, paras. 1100-1603 (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-
3396 (MeKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992); (prohibiting the possession of specified controlled substances,
including the precursors to methamphetamine). See generally Alan Daniel Gould, Criminal Law and
the Fifth Amendment. Taxation of Illegal Drugs, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 541 (1991) (discussing
state statutes that tax the sale of controlled substances); Tamara B. Maher, Legal Liabilities Faced
by Owners of Property Contaminated by Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratories: The Oregon
Approach, 27 WILLAmETrTE L. REv. 325 (1991) (discussing the health and environmental aspects of
the clandestine laboratory problem in Oregon).
8. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11055 (West 1988) (listing the analogs of
methamphetamine); see also STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 65 (25th ed. 1990) (defining analog).
9. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11383(c) (amended by Chapter 49) (listing
pseudoephedrine, or any salts, isomers, or salts of isomers of ephedrine or pseudoephedrhie, or any
substances containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, or any salts, isomers, or salts of isomers of
ephedrine or pseudoephedrine as also illegal to possess).
10. Id. § 11383(c) (amended by Chapter 49). The specified penalty for a violation of § 11383
is imprisonment in state prison for two, four, or six years. let § 11383(h) (amended by Chapter 49).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 24
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Crimes; controlled substances
Health and Safety Code § 11370.4 (amended).
SB 1363 (Mello); 1992 STAT. Ch. 680
Existing law provides sentencing enhancements for any person
convicted of possession or sale of designated controlled substances,'
including cocaine,2 or the transporting, selling or giving away of
designated controlled substances, 3 with the length of the additional
term dependent on the weight or volume of the substance involved.4
Chapter 680 reduces the weights or volumes required to apply the
additional terms, and increases the additional terms of imprisonment
for persons convicted of violating these provisions.5 Chapter 680
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351 (West 1991) (providing the punishment for
possession or sale of specified controlled substances); 21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 841-844 (1988 & Supp. II
1990) (providing the punishment for possession or sale of specified controlled substances). See
generally Eric Christianson, Exceptional Sentencing: An Analysis of the Various Factors That May
Be Considered in Granting Sentences Above the Standard Range, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 145 (discussing
federal standards used to apply sentence enhancements to drug convictions).
2. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351.5 (West 1991) (prohibiting the possession of
cocaine, and providing the punishment for possession of cocaine); see also People v. Rushing, 209
Cal. App. 3d 618, 622, 257 Cal. Rptr. 286, 289 (1989) (holding that the jury could reasonably infer
that the defendant knew of the controlled nature of cocaine because the cocaine was hidden in a can
with a false bottom, and that conviction for possession of cocaine was therefore supported).
3. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFEY CODE § 11352 (West 1992) (prohibiting the transportation,
sale, or giving away of designated controlled substances).
4. Id. § 11370.4(a) (amended by Chapter 680); see People v. Pieters, 52 Cal. 3d 894, 903,
802 P.2d 420, 426, 276 Cal. Rptr. 918, 923-24 (1991) (stating that drug quantity enhancements are
imposed according to the total weight of any compound or mixture containing the drug rather than
by weight of the drugs in pure form only); People v. Medina, 27 Cal. App. 3d 473, 476, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 721, 722-23 (1972) (holding that if specific intent to sell a narcotic is present, the offense of
offering to sell is complete at time of offer, and delivery is not an essential element); cf ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 56 1/2, paras. 1401-1402 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (providing enhancements based on the
amount of the controlled substance); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.06-220.21 (McKinney 1989) (providing
for different degrees of the crime of possession of a controlled substance based on the amount of the
substance possessed).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370A(a)(1)-(6) (amended by Chapter 680). Chapter
680 provides the following prison term enhancements: (1) Where the substance exceeds one kilogram
by weight, the person will receive an additional term of three years; (2) where the substance exceeds
four kilograms by weight, the person will receive an additional term of five years; (3) where the
substance exceeds ten kilograms by weight, the person will receive an additional term of ten years;
(4) where the substance exceeds twenty kilograms by weight, the person will receive an additional
term of fifteen years; (5) where the substance exceeds forty kilograms by weight, the person will
receive an additional term of twenty years; and (6) where the substance exceeds eighty kilograms by
weight, the person will receive an additional term of twenty-five years. Id. § 11370.4(a)(1)-(6)
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also reduces the weights or volumes required to apply the additional
terms of imprisonment, and increases the terms of imprisonment for
persons who possess for sale, transport, or sell a substance containing
methamphetamine, amphetamine, or phencyclidine.
6
CPH
Crimes; driving with suspended license
Vehicle Code § 14601.5 (renumbered & new).
SB 2022 (Leslie); 1992 STAT. Ch. 982
Under existing law, it is a crime for any person to drive a motor
vehicle knowing' that his or her driver's license has been sus-
(amended by Chapter 680); see WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 1424 (3d ed.
1961) (providing a metric conversion chart which states that one kilogram equals 2.2046 pounds).
6. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.4(b) (amended by Chapter 680); see People v.
Glass, 44 Cal. App. 3d 772, 774, 118 Cal. Rptr. 797, 798 (1975) (holding that, to support a
conviction of possession of amphetamines for sale, it must be shown that the accused exercised
control or had the right to exercise control over the controlled substance, that he had knowledge of
its nature, and that he had specific intent to sell the controlled substance). Chapter 680 provides the
following prison term enhancements: (1) Where the substance exceeds one kilogram by weight, or
thirty liters by liquid volume, the person will receive an additional term of three years; (2) where the
substance exceeds four kilograms by weight, or 100 liters by liquid volume, the person will receive
an additional term of five years; (3) where the substance exceeds ten kilograms by weight, or 200
liters by volume, the person shall receive an additional term of ten years; (4) where the substance
exceeds twenty kilograms by weight, or 400 liters by volume, the person will receive an additional
term of fifteen years. CAL. HEAI.TH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.4(b)(I)-(4) (amended by Chapter 680).
1. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 14601.2(c) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that people are presumed
to know that their licenses have been suspended or revoked if notice has been given to them by the
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), and knowledge of a restriction is presumed when the
individuals have been given notice by the court). Under Chapter 982, lmowledge is presumed if the
DMV has given notice to the defendant. Id § 14601.5(c) (enacted by Chapter 932). The DMV must
provide notice and an opportunity to be heard when it proposes to suspend or revoke the driving
privileges of a person. Id § 13950 (West 1987); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard when a state seeks to suspend or revoke a driver's license); Bennett v.
Bodily, 211 Cal. App. 3d 133, 138, 259 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203 (1989) (stating that due process
requirements must be met before withdrawing driving privileges once conferred). When the DMV
has given notice of a pending action for certain offenses, including violations of §§ 13353 and
13353.2, the person receiving such notice may within 10 days demand a hearing. CAL. VFHt. CODE
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 24
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pended,2 revoked3 or restricted4 , unless in compliance with the
restriction, for specified offenses' related to driving under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.6 Chapter 982 makes it a crime for any
person to drive a motor vehicle when the person knows that his or her
license has been suspended, revoked or restricted for refusing7 to
take or complete a chemical test to determine the person's blood-
§ 14100 (West Supp. 1992). An administrative decision to revoke or suspend a license may be
reviewed by a court of competent jurisdiction. hai § 14400 (West 1987); see Berlinghieri v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 33 Cal. 3d 392, 398, 657 P. 2d 383, 387, 188 Cal. Rptr. 891, 895
(1983) (holding that the reviewing court may look at the administrative record for errors of law, and
may also make an independent judgment on the evidence).
2. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13102 (West 1987) (defining suspension).
3. See t § 13101 (West 1987) (defiing revocation).
4. See id. § 13353.6(a) (West Supp. 1992); U § 13353.7 (West Supp. 1992) (restricting
commercial driver licensees upon violation of §§ 13353 and 13353.2, respectively). Chapter 982
subjects commercial driver's licensees driving in violation of the restrictions imposed upon them to
criminal liability. Id. § 14601.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 982).
5. See id. § 14601.2(a) (West Supp. 1992) (listing specified offenses as: (1) Driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs; (2) driving while addicted to any drug; and (3) causing bodily
injury to another while driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs); see also ie § 13352(a) (West
1987) (providing for suspension or revocation upon conviction for violations of §§ 23152 or 23153
of the Vehicle Code).
6. Iet § 14601.2(a) (Vest Supp. 1992).
7. See Payne v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1514, 1518, 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 528, 530 (1991) (holding that a defendant refused to submit to the required blood alcohol test
when he refused to take the test unless it could be administered by his personal physician); Webb
v. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d 619, 626, 232 Cal. Rptr. 50, 53 (1986) (noting that the only excuse




alcohol level" or for driving a motor vehicle and having a blood-
alcohol level of 0.08 %9 or higher.'0
JSP
Crimes; eavesdropping--cellular phones
Penal Code § 632.7 (new); §§ 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, 633,
633.1, 633.5, 634, 637.2 (amended).
AB 2465 (Connelly); 1992 STAT. Ch. 298
8. See CAL VEH. CODE § 13353(a) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring suspension or revocation
of a person's driver's license upon refusal to submit to a chemical blood, breath or urine test for
blood-alcohol content); see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553,554 (1983) (holding that the
introduction into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test did not violate
the prohibition in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution against compelled self
incrimination); Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 30 Cal. 3d 70, 634 P.2d 917, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 566 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of the "implied consent" rule contained in § 13353);
Goodman v. Orr, 19 Cal. App. 3d 845, 852, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226, 230 (1976) (stating that the purpose
of § 13353 of the California Vehicle Code is to obtain the best evidence of blood alcohol content at
the time of arrest and, in the long run, to deter drunken driving). See generally Jay Mathews, New
Weapons Against Drunken Drivers; Laws Allowing Police to Revoke Licenses on Street Seen as
Effective, WASH. PosT, Sept. 16, 1991, at A12 (reporting on the nature and effectiveness of
California's license suspension and revocation laws); Kerry Wangberg, Administrative Driver's
License Suspension, ARIZ. ATr'Y, Dec. 25, 1988, at 28, available in WESTLAW, TP-AIl tile
(reviewing the provisions, known as administrative per se laws, of Arizona and other states which
allow suspension or revocation of driver's licenses for refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test); An
Interim Report to the Nation From the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, Dec. 13, 1982,
at 46-47 (suggesting that, as part of the effort to combat the problem of drunk driving, states should
adopt administrative per se statutes allowing for immediate suspension or revocation of driving
privileges upon a driver's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test).
9. See CAL. VER. CODE § 13353.2(a) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring suspension when a
person is found driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle when he or she has a blood-
alcohol level of 0.08% or higher).
10. Id. § 14601.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 982). Upon a irst conviction for violation of §
14601.5(a), a person is fined between $300 and $1,000 or is punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than six months, or by both the tine and imprisonment. Id § 14501.5(d)(1) (enacted
by Chapter 982). A subsequent violation of § 14601.5 or of §§ 14601 or 14601.2 of the Vehicle
Code within five years of violating § 14601.5 subjects the person to a minimum ten day jail term and
a maximum term of one year, and a fine of between $500 and $2,000. Id. § 14601.5(d)(2) (enacted
by Chapter 982).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 24
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Existing law provides that it is a crime to intentionally eavesdrop
upon or record a confidential communication' without the consent
of all parties to that communication.2 Existing law further provides
that it is a crime for anyone to maliciously intercept or receive a
communication transmitted via cellular3 or cordless telephones4
without the consent of all of the parties.5 Chapter 298 provides that
any person who intentionally intercepts or receives and records a
communication transmitted via cordless or cellular phones shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 or by imprisonment in a
county jail or state prison for up to one year, or by both a fine and
imprisonment.6
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(c) (amended by Chapter 298) (defining confidential
communication); see Frio v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1480, 1488, 250 Cal. Rptr. 819, 823
(1988) (holding that a communication is confidential if either party reasonably expects the
communication to be confined to the parties).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (amended by Chapter 298); see People v. Ratekin, 212 Cal. App.
3d 1165, 1168, 261 Cal. Rptr. 143, 145 (1989) (distinguishing wiretapping, defined as the
interception of communications by an unauthorized connection to the transmission line, and
eavesdropping, defined as the interception of communications by the use of equipment which is not
connected to any transmission line).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632.5(c) (amended by Chapter 298) (defining cellular radio
telephone).
4. See id, § 632.6(c) (amended by Chapter 298) (defining cordless telephone).
5. Id §§ 632.5,632.6 (amended by Chapter298); cf 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1992) (stating
the provisions of Title III of the federal Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which contain
provisions protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications). See generally Alan Gadlin, Title
III Protection for Wireless Telephones, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 143 (proposing that radio telephone
communications should receive the same Title m protection of privacy as all other telephone
communications now enjoy); H. Lee Van Boven, Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study in
State Legislative Control, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1182 (1969) (discussing the California Legislature's
attempt in creating the Right to Privacy Act to protect people's privacy from invasion by the use of
electronic devices, and discussing the historical background behind the Act); see Keith Bradsher,
Users of Cellular Phones Put Privacy at Risk for Convenience, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1991, § 1, pt.
1, at 14, col. 1 (discussing the problems with cellular phone conversation security); William G.
Flanagan & David Stix, Telephone Voyeurs, FORBEs, Sept. 30, 1991, at 172 (discussing the growing
problem of eavesdropping on cellular telephone conversations); Tony Mauro, Cellular Spies; SH-H-
H-H: They're Tapping Your Mobile Phones; Law Sits Idle as 'Snoops' Call the Shots, USA TODAY,
Apr. 20, 1990, at 1A (discussing the lack of legislative action addressing the problems of
eavesdropping on cellular phone conversations); Tony Mauro, Cellular Eavesdropping: A Common
But Illegal Pastime, GANNEr NEws SERVICE, Apr. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curmt File (discussing the prevalence of cellular phone eavesdropping).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632.7(a) (enacted by Chapter 298). Chapter 298 further provides that
if the offender has been previously convicted of this section, or of any section governing the
prohibition on eavesdropping or recording of conversations, the offender will be punished by a fine
not exceeding $ 10,000, or imprisonment for up to one year in a county jail or state prison, or by both
fine and imprisonment. Ida; cf ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 108B-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992)
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Under prior law, a person who was injured by a violation of one
of the specified statutes could bring suit against the violator with
damages being measured as the larger of either $3,000, or three times
the actual damages.7 Chapter 298 increases the damages recoverable
under such suit to permit the larger of either $5,000 or three times the
actual damages.8
NCL
Crimes; firearm dealer registers
Penal Code §§ 11106, 12001, 12027, 12070, 12071, 12072,
12073, 12076, 12077, 12078, 12082, 12084, 12280, 12290
(amended); Public Contract Code § 10334 (amended);
Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 8100, 8103, 8104, 8105
(amended).
AB 3552 (Hauser and Peace); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1326
Under existing law all dealers who sell, lease, or transfer fire-
armsi must maintain a register of transactions2 as a condition of
their dealer's license.3 Chapter 1326 provides that a dealer need not
(stating that cellular or cordless telephone conversations fall within the area of confidential
communications).
7. 1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 1509, sec. 1, at 3588 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2(a) (amended by Chapter 298); see Beeman v. Burling, 216 Cal.
App. 3d 1586, 1601, 265 Cal. Rptr. 719, 728 n.9 (1990) (defining actual damages as real, substantial,
and just damages, or the amount awarded to the complainant in compensation for his actual and real
loss or injury); Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 365, 696 P.2d 637, 643, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143, 149
(1985) (holding that an award to the victim of a violation of § 637.2 accrues at the (ine of the
violation).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(b) (amended by Chapter 1326) (defining firearm); cf. 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1988) (defining firearm as: (1) Any weapon(including a starter gun) which will
or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (2)
the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (3) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (4) any
destructive device). Antique firearms are not included. Id
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12077(a)(1)-(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 1326) (specifying what
information the register must include); id. § 12077(b)(5) (amended by Chapter 1326) (defining
transaction).
3. Id § 12073(a) (amended by Chapter 1326).
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maintain a register for unloaded firearms which are not pistols,
revolvers, or concealable weapons.4 Chapter 1326 further provides
that it is a misdemeanor for a dealer not to keep the specified
register.5
Existing law provides for a fifteen day waiting period before
firearms may be delivered by a firearms dealer.6 Chapter 1326
provides that the delivery, sale, or transfer of non-concealable
firearms from one dealer to another, the delivery of firearms from a
California dealer to an out-of-state licensed person, and the return of
a firearm to a wholesaler, are exempt from the fifteen day waiting
period.7
Under existing law when two unlicensed parties wish to sell or
transfer firearms, they must make the transaction through a licensed
dealer or law enforcement agency. 8 Chapter 1326 provides that
delivery, sale, or transfer of firearms from a person inside California
to a licensed person outside the state need not be made through a
licensed dealer.9
Under existing law it is, with certain exceptions, a felony to
import an assault weapon into California.' 0 Under Chapter 1326,
certain persons'" who are going to or leaving an organized compe-
4. Id. § 12073(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 1326); see id. § 12001(a) (amended by Chapter
1326) (defining the terms pistol, revolver, and firearm capable of being concealed upon the person);
cf 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A) (1988) (specifying that under federal law, a register must be maintained
for all firearms).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12073(c) (amended by Chapter 1326); see Lisa Mascaro, Anaheim
Passes Ordinance Requiring Registration of Gun Dealers, New Fee, L.A. TimS, Feb. 28, 1990, at
B6 (discussing the approval of an ordinance that requires gun dealers to keep a register and pay extra
fees); cf 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) (1988 & Supp.I1 1990) (specifying that a licensed person who
knowingly makes false statements about requested records shall be fined not more than $5,000,
imprisoned not more than five years, or both); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.420(8) (1989) (specifying the
penalty for not keeping a similar register as a Class C felony).
6. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 12071(b)(3)(A), 12072(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 1326).
7. I1& § 12078(k)(l)-(3) (amended by Chapter 1326).
8. Id. § 12072(d) (amended by Chapter 1326).
9. Id. § 12078(0 (amended by Chapter 1326).
10. Id. § 12280(a) (amended by Chapter 1326); see id. § 12280(d)-(k) (amended by Chapter
1326) (specifying exempt persons as including various law enforcement officers, military personnel,
and various permit and license holders).
11. See id. § 12280(k)(5) (amended by Chapter 1326) (specifying persons must be 18 years




titive match or league competition12 involving the use of an assault
weapon are exempt from the import law if properly transported. 13
Under existing law it is a felony for persons who have been taken
into custody and admitted to a mental health facility to own, possess,
control, or receive a firearm, or to purchase any firearm for five years
after being released.14 Existing law also provides that such a person
may have access to a firearm if after the person filed a petition, a
superior court finds by a preponderance of evidence that the patient
would use firearms safely and lawfully. 5 Prior law further provided
that the person in charge of the mental facility could certify that the
patient would use firearms safely and lawfully. 16 Chapter 1326
deletes the option that a person in charge of the mental facility may
certify a person safe to use firearms. 7
Under existing law the Department of Justice may obtain from the
Department of Mental Health, records concerning permit
applications, purchase or transfer of explosives, machine guns, short-
barreled shotguns or rifles, assault weapons and destructive
devices. 18 Chapter 1326 provides that the Justice Department may
obtain records to determine whether a person may acquire, carry, or
12. See id. § 12280(k)(2)-(3) (amended by Chapter 1326) (specifying requirements concerning
where the competitive matches may take place, and stating that the match must be approved by law
enforcement or a nationally or state recognized entity which promotes firearm safety and education).
13. Id. § 12280(k) (amended by Chapter 1326); see id. § 12280(k)(4) (amended by Chapter
1326) (specifying that assault weapons must also be transported in accordance with § 12026.1 or §
12026.2 of the Penal Code). See generally Michael Connelly, Gun Hobbyists Hope to Achieve Their
Ain, L.A. T"lrns, July 5, 1990, at B1 (discussing the wide use of assault weapons in competition
matches); Jay Mathews, Groups Sue to Overturn California Gun Restriction; National Debate Shifts
to Judicial Arena, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1990, at A30 (discussing a law suit in which a plaintiff's
inability to legally transport his weapon through California to a shooting competition in Oregon is
in direct conflict with the federal Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986 which allows such
transport).
14. CAL. WELlF. & INST. CODE § 8103(0(1) (amended by Chapter 1326).
15. Id § 8103(0(4) (amended by Chapter 1326).
16. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 955, sec. 10, at 3908 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
8103(0(4)).
17. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8103(0(4) (amended by Chapter 1326).
18. Id § 8104 (amended by Chapter 1326).
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possess a firearm, explosive or destructive device, if that person is
under criminal investigation involving such activities. 9
EB
Crimes; firearm possession on grounds of a youth center
Penal Code § 626.95 (new).
AB 2777 (Archie-Hudson); 1992 STAT. Ch. 750
Existing law provides that all but specified persons,1 are
prohibited from bringing certain weapons,' including loaded3 or
unloaded firearms,4 upon any school5 ground unless it is with the
written permission of the school superintendent or equivalent school
authority.6 Chapter 750 makes it unlawful for any person to violate
19. l § 8105(d)(3) (amended by Chapter 1326).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 626.9(c), 626.10(a)-(f) (West Supp. 1992) (listing those exempt
from the restrictions imposed by this section, including peace officers and military personnel); id. §
7 (West 1988) (defiing person).
2. See id. § 626.10(a) (West Supp. 1992) (listing dirks, daggers, knives having blades longer
than 3.5 inches as some of the weapons prohibited by § 626.10); People v. Pettaway, 233 Cal. App.
3d 1067, 1069, 285 Cal. Rptr. 147, 148 (1991) (holding that a knife with a handle molded to fit the
palm of one's hand with a 2.25 inch blade protruding out through the middle fingers is a "dirk or
dagger"); Conrad v. Forden, 176 Cal. App. 3d 775,778,222 Cal. Rptr. 552,554 (1986) (holding that
a knife, sharpened only on one side, with no handguard, with a 1.5 inch blade is not a dirk or
dagger).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 626.9(d), 12031(g) (West Supp. 1992) (defining a loaded
firearm as one in which there is an unexpended cartridge or shell, consisting of a case which holds
a charge of powder and a bullet or shot, in, or attached in any manner to the firearm).
4. See id. § 12001(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining firearm); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)
(1982) (defining firearm).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626(a)(4) (West Supp. 1992) (defining school); see also id. §
626(a)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1992) (defining university, state university, and community college,
respectively).
6. Id. §§ 626.9, 626.10 (West Supp. 1992); see Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200,
1204 (D. Kan. 1971) (holding that a student suspended for possessing a firearm on a university
campus was denied his rights to procedural due process when he was not given notice of the grounds
for the charge, not informed of the witnesses or evidence to be presented against him, and not given
an opportunity to be heard in his own defense); People v. Singer, 56 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 4, 128
Cal. Rptr. 920, 922 (1976) (holding that § 626.9 is not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous, and
clearly gives notice that the possession of unloaded firearms on a university campus is prohibited).
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certain provisions7 of the Penal Code while upon or within a play-
ground8 or youth center9 grounds during open hours, knowing'0
that he or she is on those grounds.1
ACR
See generally Earl D. Osbom, The State University, Due Process and Summary Eclusions, 26
HASTINGS LJ. 252, 262-63 (1974) (listing various California statutes regulating student conduct on
university campuses); Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1027, 1059-82 (1969) (discussing procedural due process limitations imposed by the United States
Constitution and their application to the university setting).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 417(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that it is unlawful, in
general or on the grounds of a day care or recreational center, to draw a loaded firearm in the
presence of another in a rude, angry, or threatening manner unless done in self-defense); id. §
12025(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1992) (prohibiting persons from carrying concealed, in any vehicle or on
their person, any firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, without a license); id. §
12031(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (prohibiting all but specified persons from carrying firearms on their
person in any public place); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10901(f) (West Supp. 1992) (defining
recreational center); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.76 (West 1990) (defining day care
center); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining firearm capable of being
concealed upon the person); id. § 12026(a) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that those persons generally
exempt from the mandates of § 12025 include any United States citizen or legal resident of the
United States over 18 years of age who resides or is temporarily within the state and not within
classes described in § 12021); id. § 12021(a)-(g) (West 1992) (prohibiting persons convicted of a
felony or certain misdemeanors from possessing a firearm); id. § 12031(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1992)
(describing persons exempted from the mandates of § 12031); People v. Kirk, 192 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 15, 16, 238 Cal. Rptr. 42, 42 (1986) (holding that Penal Code § 417(a)(2) does not prevent a
person from displaying a weapon in a threatening manner in order to defend others); People v. May,
33 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 888, 891-92, 109 Cal. Rptr. 396, 398-99 (1973) (holding that although the
arresting officer could see the firearm by looking down into defendant's pocket, it was concealed
within the meaning of § 12025).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.95(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 750) (defining playground as
any park or recreational area specifically designed to be used by children that has play equipment
installed, including public grounds designed for athletic activities located on public or private school
grounds).
9. See id. § 626.95(c)(2) (enacted by Chapter 750) (defining youth center as any public or
private facility that is used to host recreational or social activities for minors while minors are
present).
10. See id. § 7(5) (West 1988) (defiming knowingly); Calban v. Flores, 65 Cal. App. 3d 578,
584, 135 Cal. Rptr. 441,444 (1976) (holding that the word knowing in a criminal statute means that
the violator has only to be aware of the facts which bring the prohibited acts within the terms of the
statute).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.95(a) (enacted by Chapter 750); see id. (stating that the violator
will be punished by imprisonment in state prison for one, two, or three years, or in jail for one year
or less).
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Crimes; grand theft and vandalism of water
Penal Code §§ 592, 607 (amended).
SB 1665 (McCorquodale); 1992 STAT. Ch. 402
Under existing law, the unauthorized taking of water from
specified areas,1 with the intent to defraud,2 the unauthorized
tampering of any gate used for the control or measurement of water,
or the unauthorized placement of rubbish or obstruction to the free
flow of water is punishable as a misdemeanor. Chapter 402 makes
this conduct punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony if the total
value of the offense is more than $400.00, or if the defendant is a
repeat offender.4
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 592(a) (amended by Chapter 402) (specifying canal, ditch, flume,
or reservoir used for the purpose of holding or conveying water for manufacturing, irrigating,
agricultural or domestic uses, mining, or generation of power). See CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West
1971) (providing that the general state policy regarding water use is that waste or unreasonable use
should be prevented, and that conservation should be exercised); Baldwin Park County Water Dist.
v. Los Angeles County, 208 Cal. App. 2d 87, 97, 25 Cal. Rptr. 167, 174 (1962) (holding that the
Water Code shows the intention of the Legislature to adopt a general and complete scheme for the
conservation and distribution of water).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1992) (defining fraud as an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention
on the part of the defendant thereby depriving a person of a property or legal right or otherwise
causing injury). See generally Muller v. Justice Court of Third Township, 123 Cal. App. 2d 696, 698,
267 P. 2d 406, 407 (1954) (holding that a judge need not take evidence, examine the case and
determine therefrom whether there is reasonable and probable cause to believe that the offense
charged has been committed before issuing an arrest warrant from a verified complaint charging a
violation of the Penal Code section making it a misdemeanor for any person to take water with intent
to defraud); Symposium: Revisiting California Water Law, 19 PAC. L.J. 957 (1988) (examining the
history and progress of California's water laws).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 592(a) (amended by Chapter 402). Cf LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:58
(West 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-1-7 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-14 (1992); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 90.03.400, 90.03.410 (1991) (providing penalties for unlawful interference with
waterworks). See generally CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1005.1-10010 (West Supp. 1992) (establishing the
California Water Plan for the orderly control, protection, conservation, development and utilization
of water resources).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 592(b) (amended by Chapter 402). Under prior law a violation of
this provision was punishable by a six-month jail term. 1899 Cal. Stat. ch. 110, see 1, at 146
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 592).
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Existing law provides that tampering with or maliciously injuring
structures erected to create hydraulic power, drain or reclaim any
wetland, or to store water is a misdemeanor.' Chapter 402 expands
existing law and provides that, depending on the amount of damages,
the above conduct is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony.
HAT
Crimes; insurance fraud
Business and Professions Code § 9884.75 (repealed); §§
9884.7, 9889.3 (amended); Insurance Code § 1871.1
(repealed); §§ 1872, 1872.3 (amended); Penal Code §§ 550,
551 (new).
AB 3067 (Burton); 1992 STAT. Ch. 675
Existing law provides that it is illegal to commit certain specified
acts relating to false insurance claims.' Chapter 675 specifies sen-
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 607 (amended by Chapter 402); see People v. Bosse, 21 Cal. App.
2d 276, 280, 68 P.2d 990, 994 (1937) (holding that this section is valid under the general police
power because willful and malicious destruction of any structure erected to create hydraulic power
or store excess water for agriculture purposes is a misdemeanor and public peace is paramount to any
private right); cf. CAL. WATER CODE § 4175 (West 1971) (providing punishment for unauthorized
changes in water devices or uses). See generally 16 U.S.C. § 3901 (1992) (establishing wetland
resources protection and setting forth the reasons for doing so).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 607 (amended by Chapter 402). Chapter 402 makes the conduct
punishable as vandalism. Id. Damage to property which causes a loss of less than $1000 is punishable
by a six-month jail term and/or a $1000 fine. Id § 594(b)(4) (West Supp. 1992). If the resulting loss
is between $1000 and $5000, it is punishable by a one-year jail term and/or a $5000 fine. Id. §
594(b)(3) (West Supp. 1992). A $5000 to $50,000 loss is punishable as either a misdemeanor or
felony and/or a $10,000 fine. Id § 594(b)(2) (West Supp. 1992). Any loss over $50,000 is punishable
as either a felony or a misdemeanor, but may include a $50,000 fine. Id. § 594(b)(1) (West Supp.
1992).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 550(a)(1)-(10) (enacted by Chapter 675); 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 1008,
sec. 2, at 4088 (amending CAL. INs. CODE § 1871.1) (making it illegal to knowingly do any of the
following: (1) Present or cause to be presented a false or fraudulent claim under a contract of
insurance; (2) present multiple claims for the same loss or injury; (3) cause or participate in a
vehicular accident for the purpose of presenting a false claim; (4) present a false claim for the
payment of a loss; (5) prepare any writing with the intent to present in support of a false claim; (6)
conspire or assist a person who does any of the above; (7) make a false claim for payment of health
care benefits; (8) submit a claim for health care not used on behalf of the claimant; (9) present
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tence enhancements for persons with prior felony convictions for
various forms of insurance fraud, and increases the fine for crimes
involving fraudulent claims in excess of $50,000, by permitting
recovery of double the amount of the fraud.2
Existing law provides that it is unlawful for any automotive repair
dealer3 to offer payment to an insurance agent, broker, or adjuster for
referrals. Chapter 675 increases the penalties for offering, with
fraudulent intent, a discount intended to offset an insurance
deductible.5 Chapter 675 extends to the Director of Consumer
multiple claims for payment of the same health care benefit; or (10) present for payment any
undercharges for health care benefits on behalf of a specific claimant unless any known overcharges
are presented at the same time). Chapter 675 repeals Insurance Code § 1871.1 and reenacts this
provision as Penal Code § 550. CAL. PENAL CODE § 550 (enacted by Chapter 675). Cf GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-1-9 (1992); PENN. STAT. ANN. § 474 (1990) (providing penalties for various forms of
insurance fraud). See generally L.H. Otis, Anti-Fraud Laws Could Haunt Insurance Carriers, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER-PROPERTY & CASUALTY, May 25, 1992, at 6; Kenneth Reich, Estimate ofInsurance
Fraud Hiked, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1992, at B, 3; Dan Weikel & Sonni Efron, Army of Scam Artists
Milks Millions from Insurers, Officials Say, L.A. TImEs, Mar. 1, 1990, at A30 (examining California's
increasing insurance premiums and attributing them to the millions of dollars of fraud annually).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 550(b)(1), (d) (enacted by Chapter 675). Any person who violates
this section and who has a prior felony conviction will receive a two-year enhancement for each prior
felony conviction in addition to the initial sentence. Id. § 550(d) (enacted by Chapter 675).
3. See id. § 551(e) (enacted by Chapter 675) (defining automotive repair dealer).
4. Id. § 551(a) (enacted by Chapter 675); 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 973, sec. 1, at 3259 (enacting
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9884.75). A violation of this provision is a misdemeanor and punishable
by a fine not to exceed $1000. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9889.20 (West Supp. 1992). Chapter 675
repeals Business and Professions Code § 9884.75 and reenacts this provision as Penal Code § 551.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 551 (enacted by Chapter 675).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 551(b) (enacted by Chapter 675). Under Chapter 675, violations over
$400 are punishable by 16 months, or 2 or 3 years imprisonment in state prison, a fine of not more
than $10,000, both imprisonment and fine, imprisonment in county jail not to exceed one year, a fine
not to exceed $1000, or both imprisonment and a fine. Il § 551(c) (enacted by Chapter 675). A
violation under prior law was a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not to exceed six months
and/or a fine not to exceed $1000. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 815, see. 2, at 118 (amending CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 9889.20).
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Affairs the authority to refuse to validate, or to invalidate
temporarily, the registration of an automotive repair dealer.'
HAT
Crimes; looting
Penal Code § 463 (amended).
SB 2066 (Roberti); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1339
(Effective September 30, 1992)
Existing law states that every person who commits second degree
burglary1 or grand theft2 within an affected county in a state of
6. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9884.7(1) (amended by Chapter 675). The following reasons
can result in such action: (1) Making or authorizing a statement which is untrue or misleading; (2)
causing or allowing a customer to sign a work order which does not state the repairs requested or
odometer reading; (3) failing to give the customer a copy of a document requiring his or her
signature; (4) any fraudulent conduct; (5) grossly negligent conduct; (6) failure to comply with the
provisions of this chapter, (7) willful departure from accepted trade standards; (8) making false
promises; or (9) having repair done by someone other than the dealer without the consent of the
customer. Id § 9884.7(1)(a)-(") (amended by Chapter 675).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 1992) (defining burglary as entering any house,
room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent,
vessel, floating home, railroad car, locked or sealed container, trailer coach, house car, inhabited
camper, vehicle, aircraft, or mine or any underground portion thereof, with intent to commit grand
or petty larceny or any felony); id. § 461(a) (West 1988) (providing the punishment scheme for
second degree burglary); see also 5 CALJIC §§ 14.50-14.51 (,est Supp. 1992) (providing the jury
instructions for second degree burglary).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 487 (West Supp. 1992) (defiming grand theft as theft committed
when the money, labor or real or personal property taken is of a value exceeding four hundred
dollars; provided, that when domestic fowls, avocados, olives, citrus or deciduous fruits, other fruits,
vegetables, nuts, artichokes, or other farm crops are taken of a value exceeding one hundred dollars;
provided, further, that when fish, shellfish, mollusks, crustaceans, kelp, algae, or other aquacultural
products are taken from a commercial or research operation which is producing that product, of a
value exceeding one hundred dollars; provided further, that where the money labor, real or personal
property is taken by a servant, agent or employee from his principal or employer and aggregates four
hundred dollars or more in any consecutive twelve month period, then the same shall constitute grand
theft); see also 5 CALJIC §§ 14.02, 14.20 (West 1988) (providing the jury instructions for grand
theft).
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emergency 3 or a local emergency 4 resulting from an earthquake or
a flood is guilty of the crime of looting, punishable by imprisonment
in a county jail for one year or in the state prison.5 Existing law also
provides that every person who commits the crime of petty theft
6
under the same circumstances is guilty of a misdemeanor.7
Chapter 1339 expands these provisions to apply to every person
who commits the crime of second degree burglary, grand theft, or
petty theft during and within an affected county in a state of emer-
gency or a local emergency resulting from a fire, riot8 or other
natural or manmade disaster.9
CPH
Crimes; precursor chemicals and laboratory equipment
Health and Safety Code § 11104.5 (new); §§ 11104, 11107,
11107.1 (amended).
SB 1820 (Killea); 1992 STAT. Ch. 580
(Effective August 31, 1992)
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 463(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 1339) (defining state of
emergency as conditions which, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the
control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or
city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat). Chapter 1339
further provides that a state of emergency will exist from the time of the proclamation of the
condition of the emergency until terminated. Id § 463(d)(3) (amended by Chapter 1339).
4. See id. § 463(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 1339) (defining local emergency).
5. Id. § 463 (amended by Chapter 1339). Chapter 1339 further provides that the fact that the
structure entered has been damaged by the earthquake, fire, flood, or other natural or manmade
disaster will not, in and of itself, preclude conviction. Id 463(a) (amended by Chapter 1339).
6. See id. § 488 (West 1988) (defining petty theft as theft in other cases); see also 5 CALJIC
§§ 14.02, 14.20 (West 1988) (providing the jury instructions for petty theft).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 463(c) (amended by Chapter 1339).
8. See id. § 404(a)-(b) (West 1988) (defining riot).
9. Id § 463(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 1339); cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, par. 42-1
(Smith-Hurd 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-65 (1991) (providing for the crime of looting during
a riot). See generally Paul Lieberman, Judge Says Severity of Looting, Backgrounds Dictate
Punishment, L.A. TIIms, June 14, 1992, at A43; Paul Lieberman & Greg Braxton, Riots' Felony
Cases Challenge Prosecutors, L.A. TIMES, May 14,1992, at Al (describing the prosecution of looters
stemming from the Los Angeles riots).
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Under existing law, any manufacturer,' retailer or other person
who sells, transfers or otherwise furnishes2 specified precursor
chemical substances,3 with knowledge4 or the intent5 that they will
be used by the recipient to unlawfully manufacture a controlled
substance 6, is guilty of a felony.7 Chapter 580 makes it a
misdemeanor for any manufacturer, retailer or other person to sell,
transfer or otherwise furnish any laboratory glassware, apparatus9
or chemical reagent' or solvent," exceeding $100 in value, or any
other specified chemical substances, 2 having knowledge that the
1. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAMETY CODE § 11017 (West 1991) (defining manufacturer).
2. See id. § 11016 (West 1991) (defining furnish).
3. See iat § 11100(a) (West 1991) (listing the substances included in regulation of chemical
precursors as: (1) Phenyl-2-propanone; (2) methylamine; (3) ethylamine; (4) D-lysergic acid; (5)
ergotamine tartrate; (6) diethyl malonate; (7) malonic acid; (8) ethyl malonate; (9) barbituric acid;
(10) piperidine; (1 1) N-acetylanthranilic acid; (12) pyrrolidine; (13) phenylacetic acid; (14) anthranilie
acid; (15) morpholine; (16) ephedrine; (17) pseudoephedrine; (I) norpseudoephedrine; (19)
phenylpropanolimine; (20) propionic anhydride; (21) isosafrole; (22) safrole; (23) piperonal; (24)
thionylchloride; (25) benzyl cyanide; (26) ergonovine inaleate; (27) N-methylephedrine; (28) N-
ethylephedrine; (29) N-methypseudoephedrine; (30) N-ethylpseudoephedrine; (31) chloroephedrine;
(32) chloropseudoephedrine).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(5) (West 1988) (defining knowingly); see also 5 CALJIC §
1.21 (1988) (providing instruction to be given when knowingly is part of a criminal statute).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 21 (Vest 1988) (inferring intent from circumstances connected
with the offense).
6. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETy CODE § 11007 (West 1991) (defining controlled substance
as any drug, substance or precursor listed in various sections of the Health & Safety Code).
7. Id. § 11104(a) (amended by Chapter 580); see People v. Meyer, 169 Cal. App. 3d 496,
502, 215 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1985) (holding that the focus of § 11104 is on whether the supplier
had knowledge or the intent that the recipient would use the precursor chemicals to produce a
controlled substance); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(d) (1992); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3404.01
(1991); (making illegal the knowing possession or distribution of listed chemicals knowing orhaving
reason to know that the chemicals will be used to manufacture a controlled substance); MoT. CODE
ANN. § 45-9-107 (1992) (criminalizing possession of precursor chemicals); TEX. HEALTH & SAFET'
CODE ANN. § 481.079 (Vest 1992) (criminalizing the transfer or receipt of chemical precursors). See
generally Review of Selected 1978 California Legislation 10 PAC. L.J. 406 (1979) (discussing the
passage of § 11104 of the California Health and Safety Code).
8. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 11107(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 580) (defining
laboratory glassware).
9. See id. § 1 1107(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 580) (defining apparatus).
10. See id. § 11 107(c)(3) (amended by Chapter 580) (defining chemical reagent).
11. See id. § 11 107(c)(4) (amended by Chapter 580) (defining chemical solvent).
12. See id. § 11107.1(a) (amended by Chapter 580) (listing the specified substances as sodium
cyanide, potassium cyanide, cyclohexanone, bromobenzene, magnesium turnings, mercuric choloride,
sodium metal, lead acetate, paladium black, red phosphorous, trichlorofluoromethane,
dichlorodifluoromethane, 1,1,2-trichloro-1,1,2-trifluoroethane, sodium acetate and acetic anhydride).
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goods will be used to unlawfully manufacture a controlled
substance. " It is also a misdemeanor under Chapter 580 for any
person to knowingly or intentionally possess any laboratory
glassware, apparatus or chemical reagent or solvent, exceeding $100
in value, with the intent of manufacturing a controlled substance. 4
Under existing law, any manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer or
other person who sells to any person in this state any laboratory
glassware or apparatus or any chemical reagent or solvent, exceeding
$100 in value, must require identification15 from the purchaser and
must record the purchaser's identification number on the bill of
sale. 6 Furthermore, the bill of sale must be retained for three years,
and must be presented upon demand by any law enforcement officer
or authorized representative of the Attorney General. 7 Under
Chapter 580, the bill of sale must identify the specific items and
quantities purchased. 8 Finally, Chapter 580 makes it a
misdemeanor for any person to distribute or receive any of specified
chemical precursors 9 or any laboratory glassware or apparatus or
chemical reagent or solvent, exceeding $100 in value, or any
specified chemical substances,2" with the intent of causing the
evasion of recording and recordkeeping requirements.2'
JSP
13. Id § 11104(b) (amended by Chapter 580).
14. Id § 11104.5 (enacted by Chapter 580).
15. See id § 11100(c)(2) (West 1991) (defining the requirements for proper purchaser
identification).
16. Id § 11 107(a)(1)-(2) (amended by Chapter 580); see id § 11107.1(a),(a)(1) (amended by
Chapter 580) (providing similar purchaser recording requirements for specified substances); see also
TEX. HEALTH & SAFEIY CODE ANN. § 481.080 (West 1992) (requiring similar reporting requirements
with a sale or transfer of chemical precursors and laboratory equipment).
17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11107(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 580).
18. Id § 1 I107(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 580); see id § 11107.1(a)(1) (amended by Chapter
580) (requiring that the bill of sale required by this section also identify the items and quantities of
specified substances purchased).
19. See iL § I 1100 (West 1991); id § 11107.1(a) (amended by Chapter 580) (identifying the
specified substances subject to the reporting requirements).
20. See id § 11107.1 (a) (amended by Chapter 580) (listing the specified chemical substances).
21. Id § 11104(c) (amended by Chapter 580).
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Crimes; receiving stolen property
Penal Code § 496 (amended).
AB 3326 (Boland); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1146
Under existing law, every person who knowingly buys or receives
any property that is stolen or obtained through theft' or extortion,2
is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year.3 Chapter
1146 allows a principal4 in the actual theft to be convicted of buying
or receiving property stolen in that theft.5
PGT
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 484(a) (West 1988) (defiming theft).
2. See i § 518 (West 1988) (defining extortion).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (amended by Chapter 1146); see id. (stating that every person
who conceals, sells, or withholds stolen property, or aids in the concealing, selling, or withholding
of stolen property, with knowledge that the property was stolen or obtained through theft or extortion,
is also punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year); id. (providing that the district
attorney or grand jury, in the interest of justice, may determine that such offense is a misdemeanor
if the value of the property does not exceed four hundred dollars ($400)); see also People v. Lohman,
6 Cal. App. 3d 760, 767, 86 Cal. Rptr. 221, 226 (1970) (finding that a defendant who actually
participated in a theft of property during a burglary could not be convicted of receiving stolen
property); People v. Williams, 253 Cal. App. 2d 952, 958, 61 Cal. Rptr. 238,242 (1967) (finding that
where a defendant is established as the thief, he may not be convicted of receiving stolen property
if concealment or withholding of the stolen goods is part of the activities connected with the theft);
cf. People v. Sweeney, 46 Cal. App. 2d 332, 337, 120 Cal. Rptr. 148, 151 (1975) (stating that when
a thief engages in new acts of concealment, separate from any acts connected with the actual theft,
he may be prosecuted for the later concealment).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1988) (defining principal as a person concerned with
a crime either through direct commission of an act constituting an offense, aiding and abetting such
commission, or advising and encouraging such commission).
5. Id § 496(a) (amended by Chapter 1146); see People v. Price 1 Cal. 4th 324, 463-64, 821
P.2d 610, 691, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 189 (1991) (allowing a conviction for receiving stolen property
when the statute of limitations for the actual theft had elapsed). No person may be convicted of
receiving stolen property pursuant to § 496(a), and of theft of the same property. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 496(a) (enacted by Chapter 1146); People v. Campbell 63 Cal. App. 3d. 599, 614, 133 Cal. Rptr.
815, 823 (1976).
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Crimes; release on recognizance
Penal Code § 853.85 (new); §§ 1318.1, 1319 (amended).
AB 3621 (Boland) 1992 STAT. Ch. 1009
Existing law provides that a court may employ an investigative
staff to recommend whether defendants should be released on their
own recognizance.' Chapter 1009 requires that if a court has em-
ployed an investigative staff in a case involving a violent felony2 or
felony drunk driving causing bodily injury,3 an investigative report
must be prepared recommending whether the defendant should be re-
leased on his or her own recognizance.' The report must contain
written verification of any outstanding warrants against the defen-
dant, any prior incidents where the defendant failed to appear in
court, the defendant's criminal record, and the defendant's residence
during the past year.'
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1318.1 (Vest Supp. 1992).
2. See id. § 667.5(a) (West 1992) (providing a list of violent felonies, which includes murder
or voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, rape, sodomy or oral copulation by force, child molestation, any
felony punishable by death or imprisonment, any felony in which the defendant inflicted serious
bodily injury or used a firearm, robbery of an inhabited dwelling, arson, attempted murder,
kidnapping for purposes of committing child molestation, and continuous child sexual abuse); In re
Mary Loera Hernandez, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1260, 1263, 282 Cal. Rptr. 709, 711 (1991) (treating the
crime of selling drugs the same as the violent felonies enumerated in Penal Code § 667.5 by finding
the denial of bail to be proper where defendant's failure to meet her burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence that she would not continue to sell drugs led judge to conclude that she posed
a similarly sufficient threat to justify denial).
3. See CAL. VEit. CODE § 23153(a) (West Supp. 1992) (making it unlawful for any person,
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, to drive a vehicle and injure any person other than the
driver).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1318.1(b) (amended by Chapter 1009). The person charged with
authority over the investigative staff, prior to submitting any recommendation for release to the court,
must provide written certification that he or she has reviewed the report prepared by an investigative
staff member. Id.
5. Id. § 1318.1(b)(I)-(4) (amended by Chapter 1009). The fact that the court has not received
the report at the time of the defendant's hearing to determine whether he or she shall be released on
his or her own recognizance does not preclude that release. Id § 1319(b)(2) (amended by Chapter
1009). See generally Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 3124(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1984) (allowing
a judicial officer to choose among four alternate pretrial dispositions, including releasing defendants
on their own recognizance, imposing statutorily defined conditions such as bail, temporarily detaining
the defendant until he or she is taken into custody if the person is already on conditional release, and
detain the person pending trial under certain circumstances such as a defendant who poses a serious
flight risk or a serious risk to a prospective witness or juror); United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64,
71 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the Due Process Clause prohibits the deprivation of liberty solely as
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Under existing law, a court cannot release, on their own recog-
nizance, defendants charged with a violent felony where it appears by
clear and convincing evidence that they have previously been
charged with a felony offense and have willfully and without the
court's excuse failed to appear in court as required while the charge
was pending.' Chapter 1009 requires that in all other violent felony
cases, when the court is deciding whether or not to grant defendants
release on their own recognizance, it must consider the existence of
any outstanding felony warrants, any other information in the
investigative report, and any other information presented by the
prosecuting attorney.'
LES
a means of preventing future criminal acts, and that where the judicial officer concludes that detention
is necessary because the defendant is dangerous, this finding must be based on clear and convincing
evidence).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1319(b) (amended by Chapter 1009).
7. Id. § 1319(b)(1)-(3) (amended by Chapter 1099); see CALIFORNIA SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMrrrE, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1992, at 2 (June 23, 1992) (stating that over
61% of individuals arrested on felony offenses, and released on their own recognizance or on citation,
fail to appear as promised). Pretrial release programs which currently allow many potentially
dangerous criminals to be released without adequate review can be improved to reduce this failure
to appear rate by providing the judge with sufficient information about a defendant to make an
informed decision about whether he or she should be released on his or her own recognizance. Id.
See generally James K. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo: Stay Drug-Free and Stay on Release, 57 GEO,
WASH. L. REv. 68,70,72 (1988) (finding that from 54% to 90% of those arrested for serious crimes
tested positive for cocaine, PCP, heroin, marijuana, or amphetamines, and suggesting a drug screening
and supervision program to both lower rates of drug use and crime, and to provide judges with added
information concerning a defendant's drug use to assist them in assessing the risk of a defendant's
pretrial misconduct). Many drug-abusing suspects were charged with violent and property crimes. Id.
For example, in Los Angeles, 85% of those charged with burglary tested positive for drug use. Id.
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Crimes; relinquishing control of motor vehicle to minor under
the influence
Penal Code § 193.8 (new).
AB 3365 (Umberg); 1992 STAT. Ch. 329
Existing law prohibits a person' less than eighteen years of age
and with a blood-alcohol level of 0.05% or more from driving a
vehicle.2 Existing law prohibits any person, while under the influ-
ence of an alcoholic beverage, 3 drug4 or both, from doing any
unlawful act or neglecting any legal duty while driving 5 which
proximately causes bodily injury6 to any person other than the
driver.7 Existing law also prohibits reckless driving,8 vehicular
1. CAL. VIl. CODE § 470 (West 1987) (defining person).
2. Id. § 23140(a) (West Supp. 1992); see id. § 670 (West 1987) (defining vehicle); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 2985.7(a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining vehicle).
3. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 109 (West 1987) (defining alcoholic beverage as any liquid or
solid material intended to be ingested by a person which contains ethanol or alcohol); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 23004 (West 1985) (defining alcoholic beverage as alcohol, spirits, liquor, wine, beer
and every liquid or solid containing such substances and which contain one-half of 1% or more of
alcohol by volume); see also People v. Rosseau, 100 Cal. App. 245, 247, 279 P. 819, 820 (1929)
(stating that an intoxicating liquor is a beverage containing an alcoholic content of one-half of 1%
or more).
4. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 312 (West 1987) (defining drug as any substance or combination
of substances, other than alcohol, which could impair to an appreciable degree a person's ability to
drive a vehicle in a prudent and cautious manner).
5. See People v. Hernandez, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1177, 1184, 269 Cal. Rptr. 21, 25 (1990)
(holding that the defendant was "driving" when he was steering his moving truck on the freeway
even though his engine had stalled and was not running).
6. See People v. Dakin, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 1036, 248 Cal. Rptr. 206, 212-13 (1988)
(holding that the defendant had caused -bodily injury" when he caused the victim's head to shatter
the rear glass of his truck which resulted in the victim's receiving two cuts on his forehead).
7. CAL. VEl. CODE § 23153(a) (West Supp. 1992); see id. § 305 (West 1987) (defining
driver as a person who is in actual physical control of a vehicle); see also People v. Ferrara, 202 Cal.
App. 3d 201, 207, 248 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314-15 (1988) (holding that although the defendant was found
to have been driving drunk and was involved in an accident which resulted in the death of another,
he could not be found guilty of felony drunk driving since the prosecution failed to prove that he was
also engaged in an unlawful act which was the proximate cause of the collision); People v. Watson,
30 Cal. 3d 290, 296-97, 637 P.2d 279, 283, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 47 (1981) (holding that because
vehicular manslaughter and second degree murder require different degrees of culpability, a charge
of vehicular manslaughter will not preclude a charge of second degree murder); cf CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23152 (West Supp. 1992) (prohibiting any person from driving a vehicle while under the influence
of drugs or alcohol). See generally Robert Brooks Beauchamp, "Shed Thou No Blood": The Forcible
Removal of Blood Samples from Drunk Driving Suspects, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1128-35 (1987)
(outlining constitutional barriers to the forceable removal of blood from a drunk driving suspect);
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manslaughter9 while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. 10
Chapter 329 prohibits any adult who is the registered owner" of
a motor vehicle 2 or in possession of a motor vehicle from relin-
quishing possession of the vehicle to a minor13 if: (1) The adult
owner14 knew or reasonably should have known that the minor was
intoxicated at the time; (2) the minor was found in violation of
specified code sections; 5 and (3) the minor did not otherwise have
a lawful right to possession of the vehicle.' 6 Chapter 329 provides
Mark S. Levin, People v. Watson: Drunk Driving Homicide -- Murder or Enhanced Manslaughter?,
71 CAL. L. REv. 1298, 1302-09 (1983) (discussing the relationship between second degree murder
and vehicular manslaughter, and statistics on alcohol related deaths).
8. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining reckless driving as the
driving of any vehicle upon a highway or in any offstreet parking facility in willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(c)(3) (West 1988) (defining vehicular manslaughter as
driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol and in the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony and causing death, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence).
10. Id. § 191.5 (West Supp. 1992); id. § 192 (West 1988); CAL. VEl. CODE § 23103 (,Vest
Supp. 1992); see CAL PENAL CODE § 191.5 (West Supp. 1992) (defining gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated).
11. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 505 (West 1987) (defining registered owner as a person registered
by the Department of Motor Vehicles as the owner of a vehicle); see also Rody v. Winn, 162 Cal.
App. 2d 35, 327 P.2d 579 (1958) (holding that although the wife was the registered owner of a
vehicle, since it was community property with her husband, he also could be held liable as an owner
of the vehicle with which his wife caused damages through negligence).
12. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 415 (West Supp. 1992) (defining motor vehicle).
13. See CAL. WEuF. & INsT. CODE § 602 (West 1984) (defining minor as any person under
18 years of age); see also In re Steven R., 131 Cal. App. 3d 95, 97, 182 Cal. Rptr. 384, 385 (1982)
(holding that an eighteen year old drunk driver came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions
Code § 602).
14. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 460 (West 1987) (defining owner).
15. See CAL PENAL CODE § 193.8(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 329) (listing code sections
referring to: (1) reckless driving; (2) accepting a guilty plea for reckless driving in place of a charge
of driving under the influence; (3) driving under the influence as a minor, (4) driving under the
influence; (5) causing bodily injury by driving under the influence; (6) committing gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated; and (7) committing vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated but
without gross negligence).
16. Id. § 193.8(a)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 329); cf. State v. Stratton, 591 A.2d 246, 246
(Me. Sup. Ct. 1991) (convicting the defendant as an accomplice to the driver's DUI crime since, as
the driver's drinking partner, he was aware of the large number of drinks the driver had consumed,
and nonetheless gave his keys to the driver because he thought the driver was "soberer" than he);
State v. Whitaker, 259 S.E.2d 316,319 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding that an owner who relinquishes
control of his motor vehicle to an intoxicated driver while the owner is still in the car, is tantamount
to the owner driving drunk himself); Joiner v. State, 279 S.W.2d 333,334 (fex. Crim. 1955) (holding
Pacific Law JournaI/Vol 24
Crimes
that this offense is punishable as an infraction by six months or less
in a county jail, by a fine of $1,000 or less, or both, but not by
suspension or revocation of the offender's driver's license. 17
Chapter 329 does not apply to commercial bailments, 18 motor
vehicle leases19 or parking arrangements provided for by hotels,
motels or food facilities.20
ACR
Crimes; sale of firearms
Penal Code § 186.28 (new).
SB 437 (Green); 1992 STAT. Ch. 370
Existing law makes it a crime to knowingly1 sell, transfer,
supply, or give possession or control, of a firearm to any person
that an automobile owner could not be found guilty as a principal to the crime of driving while
intoxicated unless he knew that the person was intoxicated when he gave her the keys to his car);
State v. Storms, 10 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1943) (holding that defendant's act in seating
himself in the right front seat of the car was evidence that the defendant at least implicitly invited
his intoxicated friend to occupy the driver's seat, and therefore aided and abetted him in the crime
of driving under the influence).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 193.8(c) (enacted by Chapter 329); see id. § 17 (West Supp. 1992)
(defining felony, misdemeanor and infraction).
18. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 2985.7(b)-(c) (Vest Supp. 1992) (defining bailor and bailee).
19. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6006.3 (West 1987) (defining lease).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 193.8(b) (enacted by Chapter 329).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining knowingly as imparting only a
knowledge that facts exist which bring the act or omission within the provision of the Penal Code,
and that knowledge of the unlawfulness of an act or omission is not required).
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within a class of persons prohibited from having possession of a
firearm.2 Chapter 370 provides that any person who knowingly
supplies, sells, or gives possession or control of a firearm to any
person shall be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and/or
by a fine of up to $1,000 if: (1) The person has actual knowledge that
an individual will use the firearm to commit a specified felony,3
while actively participating in any criminal street gang; 4 (2) the
firearm is in fact used in the commission of the felony; and (3) the
individual to whom the firearm has been supplied is convicted of the
felony.5 Chapter 370 also provides that this section shall only be
applicable where the person who supplies the firearm is not convicted
2. Id. § 12072(a)(1),(2) (West Supp. 1992); see Katona v. County of Los Angeles, 172 Cal.
App. 3d 53, 57, 218 Cal. Rptr. 19, 22 (1985) (holding that the corollary to the restriction on certain
classes of persons possessing firearms, for example ex-felons or narcotic addicts, is that it is also a
crime for anyone to sell, deliver, or transfer such a weapon to a person whom the former has reason
to believe is within one of those categories); cf 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1992) (providing Federal regulation
of possession and ownership of firearms); ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-72 (1982) (forbidding certain persons
from possessing a pistol); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-73-103 (1991) (prohibiting possession of firearms
by certain persons); HAw. REv. STAT. § 134-4(d) (1991) (providing Hawaii's regulations on the
lending of weapons to persons who are prohibited from possessing or owning firearms); See generally
Rick L. Jett, Note, Do Victims of Unlawful Handgun Violence Have a Remedy Against Handgun
Manufacturers: An Overview and Analysis, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 967, 969 (1985) (stating that
Congress' intent in passing the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968 was to aid crime prevention, by
making handguns less available to high-risk individuals without substantially restricting law-abiding
citizens from having handguns).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e) (West Supp. 1992) (specifying the following crimes
as those that constitute criminal gang activity if committed two or more times in connection with a
gang: (1) Assault with a deadly weapon; (2) robbery; (3) unlawful homicide or manslaughter, (4) sale
or possession of drugs; (5) shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied car; (6) arson; and (7)
intimidation of witnesses and victims).
4. See id. § 186.22(0 (West Supp. 1992) (defining criminal street gang as any ongoing
organization having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more specified crimes,
which has a common name or identifying symbol or sign, and whose members individually or
collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity).
5. Id. § 186.28(a)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 370); see id. 186.28(a)(1) (providing that the
felony committed must fall within the scope of § 186.22 subdivision (e)); see also People v. Green,
227 Cal. App. 3d 692, 700, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 146 (1991) (holding that active participation in a
criminal street gang means that there is a relationship between the defendant and the gang that is
more than nominal, passive, inactive, or purely technical, and that the defendant must devote all or
a substantial part of his time and efforts to the gang); People v. Calban, 65 Cal. App. 3d. 578, 583,
135 Cal. Rptr. 441,444 (1976) (holding that a requirement of knowledge in a criminal statute is not
a requirement that the act be done with specific intent, but rather that the defendant have awareness
of the specific facts which bring the proscribed act within the terms of the statute).
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Penal Code §§ 264.2, 266c (amended).
SB 1960 (McCorquodale); 1992 STAT. Ch. 224
Existing law makes it a crime for any person to induce another
person, except the spouse of the perpetrator, to engage in sexual
activities when his or her consent is obtained by false or fraudulent
representation that is made with the intent to create fear', and which
does create fear.2 Prior law defined fear as the fear of unlawful
physical injury or death to the person or to any relative of the person
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1988) (defining principal).
7. Id. § 186.28(b) (enacted by Chapter 370); see People v. Brigham, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1039,
1045, 265 Cal. Rptr. 486, 489 (1989) (holding that the criminal liability of an aider and abettor is
not relieved as a matter of law when the act of the perpetrator is an "independent product" of his
mind, and is outside the scope of the original criminal offense the aider and abettor originally agreed
to aid or facilitate). The Brigham court stated that relief from liability must be factually determined
by the test of whether the criminal act committed by the principal was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of an act the aider and abettor knowingly aided, encouraged, or facilitated. Iad




or member of the person's family.3 Chapter 224 deletes the word
unlawful from the definition of fear.4
CPH
Crimes; sexual battery
Penal Code § 243.4 (amended).
AB 3388 (Alpert); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1219
Under existing law, a person is guilty of misdemeanor sexual
battery1 if he or she touches2 an intimate part3 of another person
against the other's will 4 and for the purpose of sexual gratification,
3. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1299, sec. 2, at 4593 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 266c).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 266c (amended by Chapter 224); see Boro v. Superior Court, 163
Cal. App. 3d 1224, 1231, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (1985) (holding that the defendant could not be
prosecuted for rape where he fraudulently induced the victim to have sex with him by convincing
her that the sex act was necessary to save her life); ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY OF
1992, ANALSIS OF SB 1960, at 2 (June 9, 1992) (recounting the facts of the 1985 Boro case where
a man posing as a doctor called women to inform them that they were suffering from a disease that
could only be cured by intercourse with a proper donor, of which he was one). Some women believed
his story, consented to intercourse with him, and paid him for his services. Id. The author of Chapter
224, attempting to address Boro's conduct, concludes that Boro did not induce fear of unlawful
physical injury, and thus the statutory prohibition did not encompass his acts. Id. The author of
Chapter 224 has therefore removed the word unlawful from the definition of fear in order to
encompass Boro's actions. Id
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 1219) (providing that the
punishment under this section is a fine not exceeding $2,000, or imprisonment in a couity jail for
not more than six months, or both).
2. See id. § 243.4(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 1219) (defining touch for the purpose of
misdemeanor sexual battery as physical contact with another person, whether or not through the
defendant's or victim's clothing).
3. See id. § 243.4(0(1) (amended by Chapter 1219) (defining intimate part as the sexual
organ, anus, groin or buttocks of any person, and the breast of a female).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West Supp. 1992) (defining consent as used in rape
statute); see also CA.IC § 10.00 (CALJIC 5th ed. 1988) (defining "against the will" in jury
instructions for rape to mean without consent); CALJIC § 1.23.1 (CALJIC Supp. 1992) (outlining
the instruction for "consent" given in rape, sodomy, unlawful penetration and oral copulation cases);
17 CAL- JUR. 3d Part 2, § 722 (1984) (defining consent).
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arousal or abuse.,5 Chapter 1219 increases the penalty for mis-
demeanor sexual battery when the defendant is an employer' of the
victim.7 Chapter 1219 also specifies that it shall be a felony
whenever any person is convicted of sexual battery and the victim
was a minor, if the person has a prior felony conviction for sexual
battery.'
Under existing law, a person is guilty of either felony or mis-
demeanor 9 sexual battery if he or she touches'" an intimate part of
another person against the will of that person for the purpose of
sexual gratification, arousal or abuse, and if that person is unlawfully
restrained11 or is institutionalized12 for medical treatment and is
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 1219); see People v. White, 179
Cal. App. 3d 193, 205-06, 224 Cal. Rptr. 467, 475-76 (1986) (reading the statute in the disjunctive,
so that the conditions of sexual battery are met when the unwanted sexual touching is committed for
the purpose of either sexual arousal, or sexual gratification or sexual abuse, and defining sexual
abuse).
6. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12926(c) (West Supp. 1992) (defining employer as any person
regularly employing five or more persons, or any person acting directly or indirectly as an agent of
an employer, or the state or any of its political subdivisions, but not including nonprofit corporations
or religious associations).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 1219). See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
42-4-8 (Bums Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3517 (1991); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502
(1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12 (Michie 1992) (criminalizing unwanted sexual contact made for
the purposes of sexual gratification). Under Chapter 1219, the fine for misdemeanor sexual battery
is increased from $2,000 to $3,000 when the person convicted was an employer of the victim. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 243.4(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 1219). Any amount of fine above $2,000 is to be
distributed to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing for the purpose of enforcement of
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, including, but not limited to, laws that proscribe
sexual harassment in places of employment. ki
8. CAL PENAL CODE § 243.4(i) (amended by Chapter 1219).
9. See id. § 243.4(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 1219) (providing punishments of either
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year and a fine, or imprisonment in the state
prison for two, three or four years and a fine); see also id § 17 (West Supp. 1992) (classifying
offenses and providing criteria for determining when an alternate felony-misdemeanor punishment
becomes a misdemeanor).
10. Ic § 243.4(e) (amended by Chapter 1219) (defining touch for purposes of alternate felony-
misdemeanor sexual battery); see also In re Gustavo M., 214 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1498, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 328, 335 (1989) (holding that actual contact with the skin is essential for an alternate felony-
misdemeanor conviction).
11. See People v. Arnold, 6 Cal. App. 4th 18, 25-28, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 836-38 (1992)
(noting that the definition of unlawful restraint was never clarified by the Legislature, and holding
that the unlawful restraint required for violation of § 243.4 is something more than the exertion
required to commit the prohibited sexual act).




seriously disabled13 or medically incapacitated. 14 A person is
guilty of the same offense if he or she under the same conditions
causes the victim to masturbate or touch an intimate part of the
person or a third party.15
Chapter 1219 makes it an aggravating factor 6 for the purpose
of sentencing for a felony sexual battery that the defendant is an
employer of the victim.17 Chapter 1219 also allows the court to
order any person convicted of felony or attempted felony sexual




Penal Code § 1170.1 (amended).
AB 2351 (Friedman); 1992 STAT. Ch. 235
13. See id. § 243.4(f)(3) (amended by Chapter 1219) (defining seriously disabled).
14. See i § 243.4(a)(b) (amended by Chapter 1219); see Id § 243.4(f)(4) (amended by
Chapter 1219) (defining medically incapacitated); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.5(b) (West Supp.
1992) (creating civil liability for sexual battery).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(c) (amended by Chapter 1219).
16. See CAL. R. Cr. 405(d) (defining aggravation and circumstances of aggravation); see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that an aggravating factor may be used
to justify the imposition of the highest of the three possible base terms).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(h) (amended by Chapter 1219).
18. Id § 243.40) (amended by Chapter 1219); see id. § 290 (West Supp. 1992) (governing
registration of sex offenders). Only persons convicted after January 1, 1993 are subject to the
reporting requirements of this section. Id. § 243.40) (amended by Chapter 1219).
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Under existing law, when two or more specified enhancements'
may be imposed for one offense, only the greatest enhancement may
be applied.2 However, existing law provides exceptions to the
"single-enhancement" rule when specified offenses are involved.3
Chapter 235 adds the offense of sexual battery4 to the list of
exceptions to the single-enhancement rule, thus allowing one
enhancement for the use of a weapon 5 and one enhancement for
infliction of great bodily injury' when the underlying offense is
sexual battery.7
JSP
1. See CAL. R. Cr. § 405(c) (defiming enhancement); see also People v. Superior Court, 84
Cal. App. 3d 506, 512, 148 Cal. Rptr. 740, 743 (1978) (noting that enhancements in California
generally relate to the penalty imposed rather than defining an offense in themselves); People v.
Boemer, 120 Cal. App. 3d 506, 511, 174 Cal. Rptr. 629, 631 (1981) (holding that, because an
enhancement provision does not define an offense, the use of a knife to inflict great bodily injury
constituted two distinct enhancements, notwithstanding the prohibition in § 654 of the California
Penal Code against multiple punishment for a single offense).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(e) (amended by Chapter 235). The single enhancement rule
applies only to the enhancements provided by Penal Code §§ 12022, 12022.4, 12022.5, 12022.55,
12022.7 and 12022.9. Il
3. See id. § 1170.1 (e) (amended by Chapter 235) (listing the offenses which are exempt from
the single enhancement rule); see also People v. Martinez, 171 Cal. App. 3d 727, 734, 217 Cal. Rptr.
546, 550 (1985) (upholding the application of the double enhancement rule in a prosecution for
attempted rape); People v. Reiley, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1487, 1490, 238 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1987)
(holding that the imposition of double enhancements is a matter of judicial discretion, which requires
a statement of reasons from the trial judge).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4 (West Supp. 1992) (outlining the elements of and
criminalizing sexual battery); see also Review of Selected 1982 California Legislation 14 PAc. L.J.
547 (1983) (reviewing passage and implementation of Penal Code § 243.4).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(e) (amended by Chapter 235) (mandating that, for the
purpose of adding enhancements, any enhancement for use of a weapon must fall under the
requirements of Penal Code §§ 12022, 12022.4, 12022.5(a), or 12022.5(b)(2) of the Penal Code); see
also CALUIC § 17.16 (5th ed. 1988) (providing the recommended jury instruction for cases involving
the use of a dangerous or deadly weapon).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(e) (amended by Chapter 235) (mandating that any
enhancement for the infliction of great bodily injury must fall under the requirements of Penal Code
§§ 12022.7 or 12022.9); see also Ud § 12022.7 (defining great bodily injury); People v. Johnson, 104
Cal. App. 3d 598, 608, 164 Cal. Rptr. 69,74 (1980) (holding that a fractured jaw meets the definition
of great bodily injury); People v. Kent, 96 Cal. App. 3d 130, 136, 158 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (1979)
(holding that a broken hand meets the definition of great bodily injury); CALJIC § 17.20 (5th ed.
1988) (giving the recommended jury instruction for cases involving great bodily injury).




Penal Code § 646.9 (amended).
SB 1342 (Royce); 1992 STAT. Ch. 627
Under existing law, it is unlawful for any person to commit the
crime of stalking.' Under existing law a credible threat, in the
context of the crime of stalking, is defined as a threat made with the
intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the
person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her
safety. Chapter 627 redefines a credible threat to include placing the
person in reasonable fear of the death of, or great bodily injury to, the
person's immediate family.
Existing law provides that a second or subsequent conviction for
stalking occurring within seven years of a prior conviction of stalking
against the same victim involving an act of violence or a credible
threat of violence is punishable as a misdemeanor or as a felony.4
Chapter 627 provides that a second or subsequent conviction
occurring within seven years of a prior conviction of stalking against
the same victim, and involving an act of violence or a credible threat
of violence is punishable by imprisonment, a fine of $1,000, or by
both.5
1. CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9 (amended by Chapter 627). Stalking is defined as willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly following or harassing another person while making a credible threat
intended to instill in that person a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. l § 646.9(a)
(amended by Chapter 627). Many other states make it unlawful to follow a person in public, or to
otherwise harass a person. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-208(a)(3) (Michie 1988); CoLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111(1)(c) (West 1987); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 525.070(1)(c) (Baldwin 1991);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25(3) (McKinney 1989). See generally Andrea J. Robinson, A Remedial
Approach to Harassment, 70 VA. L. REv. 507 (1984) (addressing stalking by strangers and
harassment in general, surveying criminal sanctions, and offering a model statute).
2. CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9(f) (amended by Chapter 627).
3. Id § 646.9(a), (f) (amended by Chapter 627).
4. Id. § 646.9(c) (amended by Chapter 627).
5. Id Chapter 627 also provides that every person who has been convicted of a felony
stalking crime and commits a second or subsequent stalking crime against the same victim involving
an act of violence or a credible threat of violence is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
and a fine of up to $10,000. Id § 646.9(d) (amended by Chapter 627).
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Chapter 627 requires any person who is convicted of stalking and
who is subsequently granted probation to participate in counseling.
6
Chapter 627 also requires the court to consider issuing a restraining
order that may be valid for up to ten years.7 However, the restraining
order may be longer than five years only in an extreme case, where
a longer duration is needed to protect the victim or the victim's
immediate family.'
CPH
Crimes; white collar crime--Economic Crime Act of 1992
Penal Code § 1203.044 (new).
SB 541 (Presley); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1334
Existing law states that probation will not be granted to any
person convicted of a theft crime in an amount exceeding $100,000
except under specified circumstances. 1 Chapter 1334 establishes the
Economic Crime Act of 1992, which provides that probation will not
be granted if a defendant is convicted of theft of an amount exceeding
$50,000 in a single transaction or occurrence.2 Chapter 1334 states
that probation may not be granted to a defendant who has been
previously convicted of a crime for which specified enhancements
6. Id § 646.9(h) (amended by Chapter 627).
7. Id § 646.9(i) (amended by Chapter 627).
8. Id
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.045(a) (West Supp. 1992).
2. Id. § 1203.044(a) (enacted by Chapter 1334); see Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99,
115 n.9 (1988) (stating that white collar crime is the most serious and all-pervasive crime problem
in America today). See generally William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781,
789 n.24 (1988) (defining white collar crime as a crime committed by a person of respectability and
high social status in the course of his occupation); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a
Crimina4 Parts I & 11, 87 COLUmi. L. REv. 661, 748-58 (1987) (discussing the use of federal RICO
statutes to combat white collar crime).
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were found to be true.3 Chapter 1334 provides that the prior
conviction must be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either
admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the
trier of fact.
4
In deciding whether to grant probation to a defendant, Chapter
1334 allows the court to consider all relevant information, including
the defendant's attempt to pay restitution during the period between
conviction and sentencing.5 Chapter 1334 provides that if a
defendant claims an inability to pay restitution before sentencing, the
defendant must provide a statement of assets, income, and liabilities6
to the court, to the probation department, and to the prosecution.7
Chapter 1334 provides that if a defendant is convicted of theft in
an amount in excess of $100,000, probation may not be granted,
except in unusual cases where probation should be granted in the
interests of justice If probation is granted, the court must specify
the circumstances indicating that the interests of justice would best
be served by granting probation.9
Chapter 1334 mandates that if a defendant is convicted of theft in
an amount in excess of $50,000, the court must impose a mandatory
jail sentence of at least ninety days as a condition of probation.'0 If
the conviction is for theft of an amount exceeding $100,000, the
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.044(b) (enacted by Chapter 1334); see id. § 12022.6 (West
1992) (providing the sentence enhancement scheme for the taking, damaging or destruction of
property in the commission of a felony).
4. Id. § 1203.044(b) (enacted by Chapter 1334); see People v. Howard, 1 Cal. 4th 1132,
1179, 824 P.2d 1315, 1339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 295 (1992) (holding that a defendant must be
expressly advised by the court of his or her right against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by
jury, and the right to confront his or her accusers before an admission by the defendant of a prior
conviction may be used by the court for sentence enhancement purposes).
5. CAL PENAL CODE § 1203.044(c) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
6. See it § 1203.0440)(1)-(15) (enacted by Chapter 1334) (listing the items that may be
included in a statement of assets, income, and liabilities, including, but not limited to, all real
property and personal property exceeding $3,000 in value in which the defendant has an interest, all
insurance policies in which the defendant or the defendant's spouse or children retain a cash value,
and all pension funds in which the defendant has a vested right).
7. IRt § 1203.044(c) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
8. Id. § 1203.044(d) (enacted by Chapter 1334); see People v. Cazarez, 190 Cal. App. 3d.
833, 837, 235 Cal. Rptr. 604, 606 (1987) (stating that a trial court's finding that defendant's case is
not unusual, and therefore the defendant is not eligible for probation, is the only finding required
before a trial court may deny probation).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.044(d) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
10. Id. § 1203.044(e) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
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mandatory sentence will be 180 days." In addition, Chapter 1334
requires that the defendant serve a specified "mandatory in-custody
term.' 2 During this term, the defendant may not be released on any
program, including any work furlough, work release, public service,
or electronic surveillance program.1
3
Chapter 1334 provides that if a defendant is convicted under this
Act, and if probation is granted, the defendant must pay restitution as
a condition of probation, and must pay a surcharge of twenty percent
of the restitution amount to the county as specified. 14 Chapter 1334
further requires as a condition of probation, that the defendant
provide the county financial officer with all income and property tax
records, and a statement on income, assets, and liabilities within
thirty days of being granted probation, and annually thereafter. "5
Chapter 1334 requires a defendant to notify the county financial
officer within thirty days after receipt of any source of money or
property worth over $5,000.16 The defendant must also report the
source and value of the money or property received.' 7
Chapter 1334 mandates that the term of probation for all offenses
under this Act must be ten years. 8 Chapter 1334 additionally
11. Id
12. Id § 1203.044(f) (enacted by Chapter 1334). Chapter 1334 provides that if a defendant
is convicted for theft of an amount exceeding $50,000, the mandatory in-custody term must be no
shorter that 30 days, and if the defendant is convicted of theft of an amount exceeding $100,000, the
mandatory in-custody term must be no shorter than 60 days. Ud. § 1203.044(f)(1),(2) (enacted by
Chapter 1334); see United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 507 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
definite prospect of a prison sentence, even if only a short term, will act as a significant deterrent to
many white collar offenders, especially when compared to probation alone). But see Browder v.
United States, 398 F. Supp. 1042,1047 (D. Ore. 1975) (holding that well-crafted parole and probation
programs are better solutions than prison terms).
13. CAL PENAL CoDE § 1203.044(0 (enacted by Chapter 1334).
14. kI § 1203.044(g) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
15. Id § 1203.044(h)(1),(2) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
16. Id § 1203.044(o) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
17. Id
18. Id § 1203.044(p) (enacted by Chapter 1334). After a defendant has served five years of
probation, Chapter 1334 requires that the defendant be released from all terms and conditions of
probation except those covered by this Act. Id
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prohibits a court from revoking or otherwise terminating a
defendant's probation within the ten years unless and until the
defendant has satisfied both the restitution and the surcharge, or has
been imprisoned for a violation of probation.19
Chapter 1334 provides that the county financial officer must
establish a suggested payment schedule each year to ensure that the
defendant remits amounts to pay restitution and the surcharge.2"
Under Chapter 1334, a willful failure to pay the amount required by
the payment schedule or to comply with the requirements of the
county financial officer or the probation department pursuant to this
section is a violation of probation.21 Chapter 1334 further requires
a defendant to personally appear at any hearing held pursuant to any
provision of this section unless the defendant is incarcerated or
otherwise excused by the court, in which case the defendant may
appear by counsel.22
NCL
19. ld.; see id § 1203.2(a) (West Supp. 1992) (providing for the re-arrest of any defendant,
without a warrant, if there is probable cause that the defendant is violating any term or condition of
his or her probation).
20. L § 1203.044(q) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
21. IL § 1203.044(r) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
22. l § 1203.044(t) (enacted by Chapter 1334).
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